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Abstract
For years, the Republic of Croatia has been faced with the challenge of sustainability of its health care system 
due to the inefficiency of public health care institutions. It is generally believed that such development is 
the cause of health care system structure itself, which provides health care to all citizens. This paper seeks 
to explore whether public health care institutions can be more effective despite the system structure it-
self. The basic premise of the paper is that public health care institutions are ineffective because of the 
agent theory impact. In order to examine that premise, it is necessary to compare public and private he-
alth care institutions. The aim of this paper is to find out whether there is a greater impact of the agent 
theory in public health institutions in regard to different influence of private and public ownership on the 
management methods. The research methodology refers to the financial analysis of selected private and 
public health institutions. The examination of the professional qualification of managing directors of these 
institutions showed that there are no major differences in the share of experts in the field of economics 
in private and public institutions. Efficiency analysis based on the specific institutions shows that public 
health institutions are more ineffective than the private ones when it comes to cost management. Based 
on this, the conclusion is that the agent theory impact is more prevalent in public health care institutions. 
Keywords: agent theory, public health care institutions, health care system, private ownership, public 
ownership
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Sažetak 
Republika Hrvatska godinama se suočava s izazovom održivosti vlastitog zdravstvenog sustava zbog 
neučinkovitosti ustanova javne zdravstvene zaštite. Prevladava mišljenje kako uzrok tome leži u samoj 
strukturi zdravstvenog sustava, koji pruža zdravstvenu zaštitu svim građanima. Ovaj rad nastoji istražiti 
mogu li javne zdravstvene ustanove biti učinkovitije unatoč samoj strukturi sustava. Osnovna pretpostavka 
rada je da su javne zdravstvene ustanove neučinkovite zbog utjecaja agencijske teorije. Da bismo ispitali 
tu pretpostavku, potrebno je usporediti javne i privatne zdravstvene ustanove. Cilj ovog rada je utvrdi-
ti postoji li veći utjecaj agencijske teorije u ustanovama javnog zdravstva u odnosu na različiti utjecaj 
privatnog i javnog vlasništva na metode upravljanja. Metodologija istraživanja odnosi se na financijsku 
analizu odabranih privatnih i javnih zdravstvenih ustanova. Ispitivanje stručne osposobljenosti ravnatelja 
u ustanovama pokazalo je da nema velikih razlika u udjelu stručnjaka iz područja ekonomije u privat-
nim i javnim institucijama. Analiza učinkovitosti temeljena na specifičnim ustanovama pokazala je da 
su javne zdravstvene ustanove neučinkovitije od privatnih s obzirom na upravljanje troškovima. Na te-
melju toga zaključak je da je utjecaj agencijske teorije dominantniji u javnim zdravstvenim ustanovama. 
UDC/UDK 614.2(497.5)
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health care system 1. Impact of the agent theory in 
private and public companies
In the market economy system which is nowadays 
present in most countries of the world, the role of 
private companies as bearers of that system has 
been emphasized. There are less and less closed 
economies dominated by public companies and in-
stitutions where the property is mostly in hands of 
the state. However, business entities with majority 
of state ownership continue to exist in virtually all 
countries and even in those which have adopted 
the principles of open market economy. Moreover, in 
some industries, they are dominant in terms of mar-
ket share. Comparison between these two extremes 
and the advantages and disadvantages of each one 
are often being highlighted. Differences between 
private and public companies are large. The key 
difference relates to the issue of ownership that ul-
timately affects the purpose of their business. This 
paper will analyze the influence of agent theory in 
private and public companies. Because their busi-
ness goals differ, it is assumed that the influence 
of agent theory will be of varying intensity. Before 
investigating the impact on a specific example, it 
is necessary to determine the theoretical specifics 
of public and private companies and the impact of 
the principal-agent relationship on their business 
operations.
1.1. Impact of the agent theory on business 
operations of public companies
Operations of public companies and institutions 
differ greatly from operations of private companies. 
The main reason for this is the issue of ownership. 
In private companies, ownership is largely in the 
hands of private persons, while in public companies 
it belongs mostly to the state. As such, the interests 
of their business can be significantly different due 
to the influence of factors that are not relevant to 
business practice applied in companies. State-con-
trolled companies often encounter inefficiencies 
stemming from the business practices that apply 
to them. In addition, such companies sometimes ig-
nore the very purpose of their existence and fulfill 
some partial goals. Because of these specifics, the 
role of the agent theory in companies and institu-
tions controlled by the state will be analyzed. Prior 
to this, the term company which acts in the public 
interest will be defined as well as the purpose of 
its existence.
1.1.1. Business objective of business entities in the 
public sector
The term "public" is frequently used to mark the 
concept of companies and institutions that are 
under the majority of state ownership. This is 
mainly due to the fact that, in addition to all the 
other goals that such a business entity has, they 
fulfill certain objectives that are of public inter-
est, i.e. there is an interference of state in their 
operations. The term public company must not be 
confused with the concept of a public joint stock 
company, because these terms are completely 
different. The specificity of public companies and 
institutions is that their majority owner is the 
state or that they are under the control of the 
state which determines the purpose of their busi-
ness. The concept of a public joint stock company 
has a different meaning. “Such companies have 
the character of "public" joint stock companies 
because they are open to the general public on 
the capital market.“ (Orsag, 2011). Thus, the term 
public in this case does not refer to the fact that 
such enterprises are majority state-owned. In 
order to better define the purpose of the busi-
ness of public companies and institutions, it is 
important to define them. Since the research in 
this paper is to be carried out on the example of 
the Croatian health care system, it is necessary to 
determine business entities operating within it. 
“According to the IMF manual, public companies 
are all state-owned and/or state controlled enti-
ties that sell industrial or commercial goods and 
services to the general public and are formed as 
corporations.“ (Bejaković et al., 2011). Since public 
Ključne riječi: agencijska teorija, ustanove javne zdravstvene zaštite, zdravstveni sustav, privatno vlasništ-
vo, javno vlasništvo
JEL klasifikacija: G34, I18
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hospitals that operate within the Croatian health 
care system offer  certain services on the market, 
they could be categorized as public companies. 
But, they still fall under the general state, which 
means that they are financed by the state and are, 
however, to some extent different from public 
companies, and are referred to as public institu-
tions (Bejaković et al., 2011). The similarity is that, 
as well as public companies, they operate within 
the public domain (Bejaković et al., 2011). For the 
purpose of this paper, the technical differences 
between public companies and other organiza-
tions’ performance within the general state are 
not so important as the purpose of this paper is 
to investigate the specificities of the influence 
of agent theory on business entities in terms of 
ownership and the associated problems. Thus, the 
issue of public ownership is a key issue for public 
companies and institutions that deal with similar 
challenges in their performance. Regardless of 
public institutions or companies, the key objective 
of one and the other should be achieving a more 
efficient business performance. Public institutions 
are not established with the goal of obtaining 
profits, but that does not mean that their goal is 
only to achieve a level of business performance 
that will cover the costs. Public companies exist 
with the aim of gaining profits and they should 
in theory maximize their behavior. However, since 
the state is the majority owner of a public compa-
ny, the goal of maximizing the owner's utility re-
mains indefinite. The state actually represents the 
interests of citizens and thus, the management of 
public companies should move in the direction of 
maximizing their utility. The problem that arises is 
the question of how this is achieved? For exam-
ple, in a public company dealing with electricity 
distribution, there may be some dilemma around 
the business goal. Will the stronger impact on in-
creasing the utility of the state (and therefore of 
citizens) decrease  the price of electricity or maxi-
mize the value of that company in the long-term? 
The answer to this question is difficult to provide. 
The specificity of public companies is reflected 
in the fact that interference of state interests in 
their business potentially limits the possibility 
of maximizing performance. When operating this 
way, it is very similar to that of public institutions 
because they primarily exist to fulfill a certain na-
tional interest in the form of cheaper health, ed-
ucation or social welfare. It can be said that they 
face the same challenges in governance, since 
national interests may have a priority in the in-
terests of the companies themselves, and the au-
tonomy of managers managing these businesses 
is diminished. Public companies and institutions 
operate in the public sector and their goals differ 
from those of the private sector businesses. This 
is especially true in the case of non-profit orga-
nizations. So, the following goals can be set by 
non-profit organizations: to maximize the amount 
and quality of output with respect to budget 
constraints, maximize the benefits of managers, 
maximize cash flows and maximize the benefits 
(satisfaction) of users and donors (Rupčić, 2016). 
These goals will potentially enable the efficient 
operation of non-profit organizations and their 
long-term survival. The great influence of state 
and political processes often burdens the perfor-
mance of public business entities. So this impact 
can be reflected in the achievement of goals that 
determine the purpose of public sector companies. 
“However, the goals are often determined by the 
political process, i.e. by negotiating between the 
interested parties.” (Rupčić, 2016). With more sides 
involved in the process of determining the goals, 
it will be harder to define the goal that will be 
most appropriate for a particular business entity. 
It is clear that this will affect the agents (man-
agers) that will lead them and their task will be 
difficult because they will not be able to guide 
the principles that the management economics 
prescribes as an area in the economics that deals 
with enterprise management issues. In a research 
conducted on a number of profit and non-profit 
hospitals by Herzlinger and Krasker, one of the 
conclusions was that non-profit hospitals were 
less efficient than the profit ones (Arrington and 
Haddock, 1990). A similar problem is placed in 
front of public hospitals in the Croatian health 
care system. The aim of this part of the paper is 
to describe the difficulties and challenges faced 
by business entities operating in the public sector 
and those in charge of managing them. Differenc-
es with private sector companies primarily derive 
from the role of public property that may affect 
the efficiency of the business. The assumption is 
that the influence of agent theory will not be the 
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same in the private and public sectors.
1.1.2. Specifics of principal-agent relationship in 
public companies
Earlier, it was emphasized that business process-
es within business entities owned by the state 
are under the burden of state influence. Thus, the 
relationship of principals and agents within them 
will be different. The state authorities representa-
tives thus act as principals. They elect the agents 
who will manage these organizations and act 
accordingly with regard to the fulfillment of their 
interest as a principal. When set up in this way, this 
relationship does not really differ from the relation-
ship between the principals and agents in private 
companies. But there are several reasons why it is 
different, and one is essential: to whom agents in 
the public sector actually answer?“ In principle, all 
citizens have an interest in the making and admin-
istration of public policy.“ (Dixit, 2002). Citizens are, 
in fact, public sector stakeholders even though they 
are not financing it directly but indirectly through 
taxes. For this reason, public sector agents should 
act in the interest of citizens because they choose 
the government, and respond to them for their 
actions. After all, the state exists to meet citizens’ 
interests. However, citizens are virtually unable to 
oversee the activities of agents in public companies 
and institutions. In order to do so, they should come 
to certain information whose acquisition can po-
tentially be overwhelming. The logic conclusion is 
that there can be a great asymmetry of information 
among them. Even when they come to this informa-
tion, their ability to implement change is reduced 
to the election of the state government through 
elections that are regularly held every four or more 
years. That is why agents in public institutions 
and companies respond to government represen-
tatives who have relative ability to monitor their 
performance. Another reason why the relationship 
between principals and public sector agents is spe-
cific is the issue of diminished market mechanism 
influence, which is often the result of public sector 
companies having a monopoly. In the private sector, 
these mechanisms influence the control and behav-
ior of managers. For example, in the public sector, 
the risk of corporate takeover is limited, while in the 
free market it has an impact on reducing the nega-
tive impact of agents, which is applicable in the pri-
vate sector. The fact is that public sector monitoring 
will be hampered by this shortage, but it can still be 
effective to a certain extent.  “Although public sec-
tor is missing some market forces that usually con-
trol managers in private sector, state agencies and 
companies can still be effectively monitored.“ (Pin-
dyck and Rubinfeld, 2005).  The problem of efficient 
monitoring of agents occurs both in the public and 
private sectors. “Procuring a perfect monitor can be 
difficult, especially within nonprofit organizations, 
where accurate output measurement is often hard 
to attain.“ (Caers et al., 2006). For example, in public 
hospitals, it is difficult to determine how to measure 
management efficiency due to the ambiguity of the 
purpose of their performance. Also, they can be se-
verely affected by the costs because they depend on 
the number of patients who have health problems, 
and cannot charge fees that will cover the costs. 
This is so because of the organization of a health 
system in Croatia based on social solidarity. “Final-
ly, many public services do not charge the direct 
users for the full cost, but are subsidized partly or 
wholly from tax revenue.“ (Dixit, 2002). In his paper, 
Avinash Dixit shows certain public sector specifics 
that affect the principal-agent relationship and the 
creation of an efficient incentive system. These are 
the following specifics (Dixit, 2002):
• Multiple Principals
• Multiple Tasks
• Lack of Competition
• Motivated Agents.
The problems of multiple principal existence, mul-
tiple tasks (the lack of a fundamental goal) and the 
lack of competition in the public sector have been 
mentioned earlier. It can be concluded that these 
characteristics diminish the efficiency of business 
entities within the public sector. They also limit the 
establishment of an efficient incentive system that 
will motivate agents. The last feature relates to the 
motivation of agents in the public sector that may 
be greater than the motivation of agents in the pri-
vate sector. Why is that so? “In reality, agents may 
get utility from some aspects of the task itself.“ 
(Dixit, 2002). This may relate to the benefits he can 
obtain from the actions he takes in that business, 
which will happen in the public sector rather than 
in the private one (Dixit, 2002). It is important to 
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emphasize another fact that relates to nonprofit 
organizations within the agent theory. “Nonprofit 
institutions may dominate for-profit institutions 
in markets that exhibit a principal-agent problem 
between consumers and producers. Implicit in this 
claim is the assumption that nonprofits have a com-
parative advantage over for-profits in generating 
consumer, and donor, trust (Hansmann, 1980 and 
Weisbrod, 1988).“ (Handy and Katz, 1998).
1.1.3. Consequences of conflict between principals 
and agents on operations of business entities in 
the public sector
The influence of agent theory in business entities 
that are majority state-owned, and therefore con-
trolled by the state, is necessarily different from 
the influence in mostly privately-owned business 
entities. Characteristics of the public sector make 
the relationship between principals and agents 
even more complex. It is clear that, as in the case 
of a private one, this relationship will cause certain 
consequences to the business performance. But 
what connotations it will take, and in what volume, 
depends on the ability to create an effective incen-
tive system within the company. In the public sector, 
there is a danger of state interference in the per-
formance of business entities. Because government 
representatives take on the role of principals, they 
can influence normal operations. Efficiency in the 
public sector can therefore decline, because state 
interests may sometimes be presumed to the inter-
ests of business entities themselves, thereby reduc-
ing the autonomy of the manager. Also, a problem 
occurs when there are more parties that impose 
their interests (the problem of multiple principals). 
These interests may differ and parties will strive 
to reach a compromise that will ultimately have a 
negative impact on business operations. For exam-
ple, within a particular public company or institu-
tion, some interest groups that appear in the role of 
1 Again, the Croatian health care system can be taken as an example. Private health institutions will compete with one another 
over prices, advertising and other methods within the framework of competition. By doing so, they will encourage each other 
to constantly improve their own operations. In public health institutions, this is not the case, because most of the services 
they offer they do not charge but are already funded by the state. There is even a certain paradox. For example, if it is read 
that a certain health institution is better at work than the others, many patients will want to go to that hospital. Such a 
thing cannot be achieved because a hospital would then exceed its capacity. The paradox is that public health institutions 
are not motivated to improve their business because those efforts cannot be "confirmed on the market". The success of such 
institutions depends on the enthusiasm of individuals.
principals may have a significant impact. Let them 
be managers as representatives of the state and 
a specific labor union. It will be in the interest of 
managers to achieve the greatest efficiency in order 
to enable continuous operations, while unions will 
demand an increase in salaries. These two goals can 
be muddled with each other if the management de-
cides that it cannot increase efficiency if the cost 
of labor increases. If no party can take advantage 
of the negotiations, a compromise will be reached. 
In this case, a concrete public company or institu-
tion loses the most. Finally, managers do not only 
respond to the interest group that puts them in this 
position, but other interest groups have an impact 
on them as well. In the private sector, such a situa-
tion can hardly arise because the owners represent 
the main interest group in the enterprise and as 
such choose the management, and managers di-
rectly answer to them for their actions.     
1.2. A comparative analysis of the impact 
of the agent theory in private and public 
companies 
This chapter addresses a more detailed description 
of the specifics of companies operating in the public 
and private sector and the influence of agent theory 
within them. A comparison of the influence of agent 
theory in the private and public sector will be made 
here. Prior to that, the key differences between the 
two sectors affecting management will be listed. In 
the private sector, due to the existence of strong 
competition, market mechanisms are stimulating to 
businesses. In the public sector, sometimes the com-
petition is not strong enough to act encouragingly, 
and the impact of market mechanisms almost does 
not exist in public institutions.1 Also, in the private 
sector, there is an increasing autonomy of managers 
due to the increasing trend of separation of owner-
ship from the management, and this enables skilled 
Source: the authors
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managers to realize their potential and improve the 
performance of a company.2 In the public sector, the 
autonomy of managers is limited (especially in pub-
lic organizations) because all important decisions 
they make must first be approved by the represen-
tatives of state authorities. The most important 
question relates to defining the stakeholder group 
to which managers answer. By comparing public 
and private sectors within the theoretical part of 
the work, some findings are provided that will now 
be presented. The key difference, with regard to the 
influence of agent theory in the private and public 
sectors, is the problem of the uncertainty of busi-
ness objective. In business entities operating in the 
private sector, the business objective is most often 
precisely defined and provides a basis for measur-
ing the performance of agents within their over-
sight. In business entities operating in the public 
sector, it is difficult to precisely define it because of 
the influence of state interests. It is therefore more 
difficult to monitor the activity of agents that can 
manipulate various goals to maximize their own 
utility, and it is difficult to create an effective incen-
tive system. There are also differences with regard 
to the responsibilities of managers or agents. In the 
private sector, they respond directly to the owners 
who have chosen them. The public sector is faced 
with the possibility of emerging multiple principals 
and it becomes unclear to whom the agents are in 
fact responsible. If there are more principals, each 
will require some of their goals to be met and they 
will have to negotiate within each other in order to 
reach a compromise. This also affects the ambiguity 
of business goals and harms the business itself. The 
last distinction to be made here relates to the mo-
tivation of agents in private and public sector. It can 
be assumed that the public sector agents are more 
likely to be motivated by some higher goals that are 
not related to their personal utility function as op-
posed to the private sector agents. This completes 
the theoretical part of the work. The next chapter 
will be based on a concrete research of impact of 
the agent theory on the example of Croatian health 
care system. One emphasizes once again that there 
are certain technical differences between public/
2 On the other hand, the growth of manager autonomy emphasizes the influence of agent theory in the company as managers 
increase their ability to act in the direction of their own interests. However, such a development could not be prevented due 
to the growth of business complexity.
private companies and public/private health care 
institutions that are not crucial for the purpose of 
this paper because the subject of this paper relates 
to the issue of ownership impact (whether private 
or public) on the agent problem in business entities.
2. Impact of the agent theory on 
the example of Croatian health care 
system
Previous part of the paper was primarily concerned 
with theoretical description of the problem that 
relates to the agent theory with reference to cer-
tain examples. What follows is a concrete research 
of impact of the agent theory in private and public 
companies or institutions, on the example of the 
Croatian health care system. The reason why the 
Croatian health care system has been taken as an 
example for the research is the dominance of public 
health institutions that have certain problems with 
management efficiency. By comparing them with 
private-sector institutions, the goal is to examine 
what the basic differences in management meth-
ods in these two sectors are and whether there is a 
significant impact of the agent theory in them. The 
research is carried out on the basis of analysis of 
specific private and public institutions. It will be 
investigated in which professions senior executives 
are at the highest managerial position in these in-
stitutions and whether the lack of economic experts 
is the cause of business difficulties. In the end, the 
final cognitions of impact of the agent theory in 
these institutions will be presented. Prior to that, 
a strategic analysis of Croatian health care system 
will be carried out with the aim of creating a basis 
for further analysis.
2.1. Strategic analysis of the Croatian health 
care system
Strategic analysis is included in the research to 
emphasize the facts and specifics associated with 
concrete area of provision of health care services. 
Institutions operating within this area are primarily 
affected by the health care system structure in the 
country where they operate. For example, in some 
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countries, they differ in the way that there is a dom-
inance of public or private institutions. “From an 
economic point of view, it is difficult to sustain the 
argument that health services are to be provided to 
everyone and at any time, regardless of the costs.“ 
(Šverer et al., 2012).  Countries applying a system 
that presumes that everyone has to be provided 
with health care practically gave up market laws 
as regulators of economic activities within that 
area. The Croatian health system is based on the 
assumption that everyone should be provided with 
basic health care. This type of system is currently 
highlighted as the most appropriate due to the 
existing conditions in Croatia, primarily with regard 
to purchasing power of citizens.3 Nonetheless, there 
are private health institutions that have found their 
place in the market and succeed in competing with 
the public ones in certain segments. The strategic 
analysis will first introduce general information on 
the Croatian health care system in terms of funding 
and some numerical data that will clarify current 
situation in the system itself. After that, an analysis 
of "Porter's five forces" will be made. The scope of 
the strategic analysis can be more extensive than 
the one that will be done in this paper, but it will 
be sufficient because the strategic analysis is not 
the subject of this paper and will serve as a basis 
for addressing the challenges faced by specific in-
stitutions operating within the health care system.
2.1.1. General information on the Croatian health 
care system
Each sovereign state needs to issue a specific docu-
ment under which it prescribes the basic postulate 
of the implemented health care system. “The 1993 
3 American health care system can be taken as an example where health care is not provided to all citizens. This leads to the 
fact that many citizens do not even have the basic health insurance.
Health Care Act displayed principles, organization 
and implementation of health care in Croatia.“ 
(Šverer et al., 2012). It was the basis for the appli-
cation of health care in the Republic of Croatia. The 
chief regulator of Croatian health care system is the 
Minister of Health, while financing is in the hands of 
the Minister of Finance (European Observatory  on 
Health Systems and Policies, 2017). All institutions 
and companies operating within the system are 
regulated in the same way, regardless of whether 
they are profitable or non-profitable. (European 
Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2017). 
The health financing system, where access to health 
services does not depend on financial capabilities, 
is called public funding (Kovač, 2013). Such funding 
is largely applied in Croatia, which will be shown 
later. "The Croatian health system is based on the 
principles of social security. It covers public and 
private provision and financing of services.“ (Kovač, 
2013). Table 1  shows the total revenue and expen-
diture of the Croatian Institute for Health Insurance 
on the basis of which it will be possible to make a 
more conclusive finding on the method of financing.
Most of the Croatian Institute for Health Insurance 
income refers to income from contributions. “All 
these revenues (except for voluntary health insur-
ance) come from the state budget because, from 
2002, the Croatian Institute for Health Insurance 
does not collect the contributions (which are 3/4 
of the income) autonomously, but they are collected 
through the national budget and then transferred 
to the Croatian Institute for Health Insurance (or 
directly to health institutions).“ (Kovač, 2013). Most 
of the expenditures refer to overall health care, 
Year 2015 2016
1. Total revenue (a+b) 22.156.101.065 23.725.904.027
a) Revenue from contribution 18.121.281.522 18.468.680.704
b) Other revenue 4.034.819.543 5.257.223.323
2. Total expenditure (c+d) 22.746.178.850 23.029.196.616
c) Total health care (expenditure) 20.101.295.820 20.260.904.343
d) Other expenditure (fees + other 
expenditures) 2.644.883.030 2.768.292.273
3. Surplus/deficit (1.-2.) - 590.077.785 696.707.411
Source: Croatian Institute for Health Insurance (2016).
Table 1 Revenue and expenditure of Croatian Institute for Health Insurance for the period 2015-2016, HRK
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which includes compulsory, supplementary care 
and safety at work. This suggests that the public 
funding of the health system relies on a system 
of contributions by which health care system has 
been funded. Of the total health care expenditures, 
most are for compulsory care, only a minor part is 
for supplementary care that refers to voluntary con-
tributions of citizens to Croatian Institute for Health 
Insurance (2016). Citizens can arrange supplemen-
tary insurance policies with other companies if the 
offer from Croatian Institute for Health Insurance 
does not satisfy their needs. It is clear that a certain 
proportion of citizens (depending on their income) 
will use private health care services because of the 
comparative advantages they can provide (shorter 
waiting lists, personalized service). Interestingly, 
in 2016, Croatian Institute for Health Insurance 
had an excess of revenue. However, this is prima-
ry the result deriving from other revenues in the 
form of certain state budget payments. Compared 
with income from contributions and total health 
care expenditures, it is clear that expenditure on 
health care is higher. “Funding for the health care 
system is largely based (about 80%) on the contri-
butions paid by the insured, which includes Croatia 
among the countries belonging to the Bismarck 
model, i.e. the health insurance model.“ (Zrinščak, 
2007). This claim is also proven by the data pre-
sented previously, according to which about 81% 
of the health system is funded through contribu-
tions. In Croatia, a significant part of government 
spending is disbursed on health. According to the 
World Health Organization in 2014, health care al-
locations accounted for 14% of total government 
spending, which represents a decrease compared to 
2011 when they amounted to 15.1% (World Health 
Organization, 2014). It makes a large part of gov-
ernment spending because of the way the health 
care system is set up. Also, total health insurance 
spending in Croatia for 2011 amounted to 6.8% of 
GDP (World Health Organization, 2014). This data 
shows the burden that the Croatian health care 
system poses for the state itself, or for its budget, 
because a significant portion of government spend-
ing is spent on financing the health care system. Ac-
cording to the budget execution plan, the Ministry 
of Health exceeded the plan and in 2016 paid more 
than planned (Ministarstvo zdravstva, 2016). Table 
2 shows certain information about the structure of 
the Croatian health care system.
Presented data shows that the structure of active 
legal entities is dominated by non-profit legal 
entities, which points to the predominantly public 
character of the Croatian health care system. The 
number of employees alone indicates the size of 
the system, and according to the data, the average 
number of employees in active legal persons is 24 
employees per legal entity. Below, the private part 
of the health care system will be examined.
According to data from the previous table, 27.74% 
of the total number of active legal entities are 
legal persons. Since the State Bureau of Statistics 
Category 2015
Number of registered legal entities in health care system 4.693
Number of active legal entities in health care system 2.779
Number of non-profit legal entities in health care system 2.008
Number of profit legal entities 771
Total number of health care institutions 1.356
Number of employees in health care system 67.297
Source: State Bureau of Statistics (2016) and the Croatian Institute for Public Health (2015).
Table 2 Information on the structure of Croatian health care system
Year Total number of institutions
Number of 
institutions that 
realize net profit
Percentage share
Number of 
institutions that 
realize net loss
Percentage share
2007 696 558 80.17% 142 20.40%
2008 869 642 73.88% 227 26.12%
2009 920 672 73.04% 248 26.96%
Source: Šverer et al. (2012), p. 36.
Table 3 Absolute number and share of private health care institutions in regard to realizing net profit/loss
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does not state how many of these profitable legal 
entities are privately owned, one cannot specify 
the number of private health institutions. It can 
be assumed that most of the profit institutions in 
the health care system are privately owned. Table 3 
contains information on the number of private in-
stitutions that have made a profit or a loss. It refers 
to the period between 2007 and 2009 since newer 
data were not available because private health care 
institutions are not required to publicly publish 
their financial statements.
It is evident that the number of institutions grows 
yearly, but the proportion of those who gain profit 
reduces. It can be concluded that this is because of 
the increase in competition. This table proves that 
there are some discrepancies in data. According to 
the State Bureau of Statistics, in 2015, there were 
771 profit legal entities in Croatia, while Table 3 
shows that there were already 920 private health 
institutions in 2009. For this reason, it is difficult to 
specify their total number. According to the World 
Health Organization's latest available data, in 2011, 
17.5% of total health consumption was related 
to private consumption, an increase compared to 
2000 when it was 13.9% (World Health Organiza-
tion, 2014). According to the World Bank, private 
health consumption in Croatia represents 1.4% of 
GDP, while in the United States it represents 8.9% 
(World Bank, 2017). It is obvious that the private 
health sector is slowly developing and starting to 
compete with the public health sector. It is possi-
ble that private health institutions have certain 
comparative advantages over public institutions 
regarding the impact of market mechanisms.
2.1.2. Analysis of Porter's five forces in the private 
part of the health care system
Porter's model is used to show the competitive 
position of a particular company within a partic-
ular industry depending on the five forces, i.e. the 
competitive forces developed by Michael Porter 
(2008). “Understanding the competitive forces, 
and their underlying causes, reveals the roots of 
an industry’s current profitability while providing a 
framework for anticipating and influencing compe-
4 Classification according to National Classification of Activties: 8622- Djelatnosti specijalističke medicinske prakse, available 
on: https://e-obrt.minpo.hr/dokumenti/nkd2007_s_objasnjenjima.pdf (17. 08. 2017.)
tition (and profitability) over time.“ (Porter, 2008). 
These are the competing forces that determine 
the competitiveness of the industry: rivalry among 
existing competitors, threat of new entrants, bar-
gaining power of suppliers, bargaining power of 
buyers and threat of substitute products or services 
(Porter, 2008). This paper will analyze their impact 
on health institutions from the private part of the 
health care system operating in the field of medical 
practice4 because the analysis in the public part is 
not applicable due to the absence of competition 
(Bisnode, 2014). The aim is to identify which com-
peting forces influence most on these institutions 
with regard to the specificity of the system itself.
1. Rivalry among existing competitors:
• As part of its activities in 2013, 489 business 
entities were active, which indicates a large 
number of competitors (Bisnode, 2014).
• The CR8 concentration index for 2013 is 
0.3433 (Bisnode, 2014) which indicates 
that this industry is fragmented. There is a 
domination of small and micro companies.
• The share of 10 largest enterprises in total 
revenues was 39.91% in 2013 (Bisnode, 2014).
• In the same year, the largest institution had a 
share of 11.47% versus total revenue with the 
share of 30.53% in top 10 companies (Bisnode, 
2014).
• According to the previous data it can be 
concluded that there exists certain rivalry 
among the competitors. In addition, the 
industry is quite differentiated by the number 
of services it can provide.
• There are exit barriers in the form of contracts 
with the Ministry of Health and Croatian 
Institute for Public Health as a precondition 
for providing services within the health 
care system. High fixed costs in the form of 
specialized equipment.
• It is necessary to emphasize the competition of 
public health institutions to which most of the 
total health consumption in Croatia is spent.
2. Threat of new entrants:
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• State restraints enable lower risk of entering 
new competitors.  One needs a state licence to 
perform certain activities.
• Specialized services are provided within the 
scope of activities for which specific knowledge 
is required.
• The use of economy of scope for cost reduction. 
Institutions operating in the industry can 
provide more services within a joint bid (e.g. 
treatment and rehabilitation).
• There are no companies with a very high 
market share that can leverage the effects of 
economy of scale. There is no control over key 
resources.
• The market advantages of long-acting 
competitors in the market and the acquisition 
of a certain level of intellectual capital (know-
how).
3. Threat of substitute product or services/
opportunities of complement products or 
services:
• There are no classic substitutes (e.g. honey 
and sugar) for services offered under specialist 
medical practice. Alternative medicine may 
possibly be listed, but it cannot be a classic 
substitute.
• Development of health tourism within which 
institutions could offer certain health services 
combined with tourist offer. Opportunities for 
business entities operating in health care to 
take advantage of the effects of the economy 
of scope.
4. Bargaining power of buyers:
• Because a certain level of health care is 
guaranteed to all citizens, the negotiating 
power of the consumer in this respect is strong. 
It is necessary to offer consumers something 
they cannot get in the public sector.
• It is weaker in case they need faster medical 
treatment due to long waiting lists in public 
health institutions.
• Consumers usually perform individually and do 
not have enough power to negotiate the price.
• The existence of a large number of competitors 
in the private part of the health care system 
affects their strength as they will be able to 
choose the facility that provides them with 
better and more favorable conditions.
• The consumers do not know the specific cost 
before they are diagnosed by a physician 
(Šverer et al., 2012), which can reduce their 
bargaining power.
5. Bargaining power of suppliers: 
• There is no business entity in the private part of 
the health care system that is highly dominant 
in terms of market share. Entities cannot use 
their size as an argument in negotiating with 
suppliers, so suppliers have greater negotiating 
power.
• Specific knowledge is needed for the 
production of most medical equipment, 
especially medicines. Finding another vendor 
in case of cessation of co-operation with the 
present may be long-lasting.
• In the distribution of medicines and sanitary 
materials company Medika d.d. has 36% of 
market share in the hospital channel, which 
makes it the dominant supplier on the market. 
This allows it greater negotiating power in 
negotiating conditions of co-operation.
"Five Force Analysis" for the area where private 
health care institutions are engaged in general 
medical practice has allowed insight into certain 
factors affecting the level of competitiveness 
among them. This concludes a strategic analysis of 
the Croatian health care system, while the follow-
ing examples will be used to analyze the way and 
the success of management in private and public 
sector.
2.2. Management analysis in the public 
health care system
Management analysis seeks to identify possible dif-
ferences in the influence of agent theory in private 
and public part of the health care system within the 
scope of this paper. First, professions of the leading 
people (directors) of private and public health insti-
tutions are explored, in order to examine whether 
there is a greater proportion of directors in private 
institutions who have completed a particular study 
of economics, and are thus, familiar with the basic 
principles of management economics. The research 
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will be based on publicly available information pro-
vided by the health care institution or other entities 
such as Financial Agency. After that, on the example 
of a certain number of institutions, the goal is to 
examine management methods by using certain 
indicators that point to the quality of management. 
This analysis should ultimately enable the recogni-
tion of differences considering impact of the agent 
theory.
2.2.1. Examination of professional qualifications 
of directors in institutions from the public health 
care system
Public health institutions are often called out by the 
public because of their inefficiency, which is partic-
ularly reflected in state hospitals. In the last year, 
only three state hospitals realized a positive busi-
ness result. This is influenced by numerous factors 
such as the organization of the health care system, 
state interests, citizens interests, economic trends 
and so on. It is rarely mentioned that the qualifica-
tion of senior executives is a potential reason for 
their inefficient business result (the issue of agent 
theory and stewardship theory). For this reason, it 
will be examined which professions the principals 
are in, on a sample of 61 public health institutions, 
including clinical hospital centers, general hos-
pitals, special hospitals and medical centers. The 
research was based on data obtained from the 
Croatian Institute for Health Insurance. Research 
results are presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1 shows that the directors who have com-
pleted a certain degree of education in economics 
are a minority. Directors who are experts in the field 
of medicine are dominant. For this reason, it can be 
concluded that the vast majority of managers are 
not well acquainted with the basic principles of the 
management economics, which is a prerequisite for 
managing all business entities (both profitable and 
non-profitable), because they do not have a certain 
level of economic education. It is therefore possible 
that their interests and goals in these institutions 
will be different from those that the directors with 
education in the field of economics would have, 
who are guided by the principles of economics in 
their work. When considering only clinic hospital 
centers and general hospitals, that are dominant 
by the number of employees and total income and 
expenditures, the situation is even more unfavor-
able. In a sample of 33 business entities, in only 
one of them the director is educated in the field of 
economics (Croatian Institute for Health Insurance 
data). To manage entities with such resources, top 
managers must have a great deal of experience in 
managing and efficiently delegating resources. That 
is because they make major decisions regarding the 
operations of these business entities that can have 
a significant impact on their performance.
A link can be made to the agent theory. If it is as-
sumed that the managers with education in the 
field of economics will be guided by the principle 
of maximizing performance as their profession 
stipulates. Their goal will be to achieve the greater 
efficiency of the business entity they manage. There 
is a greater risk that managers who are not profes-
sionals in the field of economics will meet certain 
interests that are inconsistent with maximizing 
performance. For example, when they should make 
certain decision, it cannot be safely stated that man-
agers (in the role of agents) with education in the 
field of economics and those with other education-
al backgrounds will be led by the same principles 
and goals and make the same business decisions. 
It can be assumed that managers with education 
Source: the authors, based on data from the Croatian Institute for Health Insurance.
Figure 1 Examination of professional qualification of directors in Croatian public health institutions
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in economics will behave according to the rules of 
their profession (although there is a potential for 
divergent behavior). They will increase their reputa-
tion if the business entity they manage operates as 
efficiently as possible. Managers of some other pro-
fession may be more interested in getting as many 
patients as possible or improving their reputation 
by acquiring the most modern technology. This is 
one of the reasons why the influence of agent theo-
ry can be more pronounced in business entities run 
by managers of other professions. In certain hospi-
tals there are deputy directors who are in charge 
of financial business. They practically represent the 
only experts from economics in the health care 
institution administration, and it is questionable 
whether this is sufficient for their proper orienta-
tion. It is to be understood that the economics is not 
only referred to a financial aspect of business but it 
includes knowledge about managing all aspects of 
a particular business entity. Obviously, public health 
institutions management is dominated by the view 
that directors who are experts in the field of medi-
cine will manage these institutions better.
2.2.2. Analysis of the operation of selected public 
health institutions 
The analysis of the operation of public health in-
stitutions will be carried out on the basis of budget 
reports, budget and extra-budgetary users of three 
selected clinic health centers. These are KBC Rijeka, 
KBC Split and KBC Osijek. These three institutions 
are selected due to their similarity in scope and 
type of business for easier comparison. Reports are 
taken from the official sites of the mentioned insti-
tutions and refer to 2016. Table 4 shows the total 
revenue and expenditure of the aforementioned 
institutions.
The first conclusion that can be made from the pre-
sented data is that these hospitals have a very large 
amount of funds. This is also supported by the fact 
that the average property of these three hospitals is 
about HRK 635 million. On average, they generated 
about HRK 827 million in revenue and about HRK 
868 million in expenditure. KBC Rijeka is the only 
one that generated the surplus of business revenue, 
while KBC Split and KBC Osijek had very high rev-
enue deficit that necessarily stems from inefficient 
business performance. It is a worrying fact that all 
hospitals have an unfavorable difference between 
revenue and expenditure compared to the previous 
year. This is especially noticeable at KBC Split and 
KBC Osijek. The revenue deficit in KBC Split in the 
period from 2014 to 2016 increased by 97%. In 
KBC Osijek, this growth was even higher and in the 
same period it was 450%. An even bigger problem 
is the fact that this growth was due to the growth in 
expenditures, while revenue did not change signifi-
cantly. This indicates that great issues considering 
cost management exist in these institutions, which 
is mainly the responsibility of administration of the 
institution. Since most of the income that these 
hospitals are receiving comes from the state bud-
Institution Total revenue (2016) Total expenditure (2016) Surplus/deficit (2016) Surplus/deficit (2015)
KBC Rijeka 839.367.006 836.632.073 2.734.933 19.046.397
KBC Split 903.102.390 956.792.091 - 53.689.701 - 44.791.219
KBC Osijek 738.452.499 811.248.550 - 72.796.051 - 52.642.718
Source: KBC Rijeka (2016), KBC Split (2016), KBC Osijek (2016).
Table 4 Total revenue and expenditure of selected public institutions in 2016, HRK
Source: KBC Rijeka (2016), KBC Split (2016), KBC Osijek (2016).
Figure 2 Average structure of business expenditure for KBC Rijeka, KBC Split and KBC Osijek
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get, it is necessary to analyze their business expens-
es more closely. As part of cost management, there 
is the largest opportunity for improving the effi-
ciency of the business operations of the mentioned 
institutions. Therefore, it is necessary to study which 
expenditures are dominant in the structure of to-
tal expenditure. The following Figure 2 shows the 
average structure of business expenditures of the 
previously mentioned hospitals.
Operating expenses account for most of the total 
expenditures of these hospitals. On average, they 
account for about 90% of total expenditures. As it 
could be assumed, expenditures that are dominant 
in the structure of operating expenses of these 
institutions are expenditures for employees and 
material expenditures. This suggests that there is 
space for more efficient cost management, which 
would affect reduction of costs. Earlier, it was not-
ed that expenditures in all these institutions grew 
year after year. It raises the question of exactly what 
expenditure has affected the growth of total ex-
penditures. Thus, in all the institutions, this growth 
was mainly due to the growth in expenditures for 
employees and material expenditures, while in 
KBC Split there was a pronounced increase in ex-
penditures for services. It can be assumed that cost 
management is not systematically accessed, which 
ultimately results in a constant increase in expen-
ditures. The influence of various interest groups 
on the agents (managers) is also possible, which 
is characteristic for business entities operating in 
the public domain. For this reason, the influence 
of agent theory may be even more pronounced 
because agents face the problem of multiple prin-
cipals and try to find a compromise in their actions 
(e.g. the influence of trade unions and the state). 
In the example of KBC Split and KBC Osijek, it is 
evident that business management is not efficient 
enough. Evidence for this is the achievement of a 
negative business outcome that ultimately burdens 
the entire health care system. Based on such infor-
mation, it is possible to assume a certain influence 
of the agent theory, although it is difficult to con-
firm it. It is only possible to state that in the an-
alyzed institutions expenditures are not managed 
in an adequate manner, which may point to some 
other interests of senior management in such busi-
ness entities. It would be incorrect to assume the 
agent theory as the only reason for such operations 
of public health institutions. Certain level of influ-
ence is caused by impact of the stewardship theory. 
Due to the management structure in which experts 
from the field of economics are in minority, one 
can assume that some of the inefficient business 
derives from insufficient knowledge in economics 
by the management. It is also worth noting the 
impact of the health care system structure itself, 
which provides everyone with health care regard-
less of the cost. However, the analysis of expendi-
tures in specific institutions has shown that they 
are not managed adequately independently of the 
abovementioned fact. An additional problem is the 
inability to establish an efficient incentive system 
for agents in business entities with majority public 
ownership. In public health institutions, this is even 
more pronounced because it is difficult to pinpoint 
the basic business objective on which the incentive 
system can be created. This ultimately affects the 
decline in the value of the principal, in this case, the 
state and its citizens.
2.3. Management analysis in private health 
care institutions
Once a management analysis has been carried out 
in the public part of the health care system, it is 
necessary to do the same for its private part. It will 
be interesting to see if there is a greater share of 
experts from the field of economics at managerial 
positions of private health care institutions than of 
the public ones. Also, business operations will be 
analyzed on a number of specific private institu-
tions, after which it will be possible to compare the 
management methods with public institutions.
2.3.1. Examination of professional qualifications 
of directors in institutions from the private health 
care system
Earlier analysis has shown that small and micro 
companies dominate in the private part of the 
health care system. Only two companies classify 
into the medium-sized enterprises by their total 
revenue (Bisnode, 2014). Based on this, it can be 
concluded that in most of them there is no sepa-
ration of ownership from management. As a result, 
17 major private health care institutions from the 
field of specialist medical practice will be includ-
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ed in research, as by involving other institutions 
research would not be relevant.5 Research data 
on professional qualification of directors has been 
collected from official Internet sites of institutions 
and publicly available information about business 
entities.6 Research results are presented in Figure 3.
In a sample of 17 major private health care institu-
tions, only two top managers have completed a cer-
tain degree of education from economics. In others, 
a management system similar to public institutions 
dominates where there is an assistant director in 
charge of financial affairs or the founder (owner) 
is also the general director. The research has point-
ed out that there are no major differences in the 
qualification of managers in private and public 
health care institutions. A particular problem with 
research in private institutions is a smaller sample 
(for the aforementioned reason), but it is possible 
to spot certain trends in the private sector. It can 
be said that in the private part of the health care 
system there is no overwhelming stance that eco-
nomic experts should be in the position of general 
director. As a result, impact of the agent theory on 
those institutions where there is separation of own-
ership from management can be more pronounced. 
5 On the example of public health institutions, it was possible to analyze all the institutions listed in the Croatian Institute 
for Health Insurance address book as they correspond to the needs of research. If all private health institutions were 
involved in the research, the share of the director with education from economics would be much smaller, as most of these 
establishments are made up of smaller offices (e.g. private orthopedic clinics) where the founder of the surgery is also the 
owner. The founders of such small clinics are mostly individuals who are experts in the field of medicine (dentists, doctors, 
physicians, etc.). For this reason, a sample that would include all private health care institutions would not be representative.
6 The authors rely on the truthfulness of the data published until August 23rd, 2017. According to the analysis of 17 business 
entities, in 15 of them qualification of the director is a professor or doctor of medicine. In two subjects, director is a person 
with qualification MBA (Master of Business Administration).
7 This does not mean that institutions would not achieve better results if managers were the people of economic education 
or management experts.
Similar to public institutions with managers from 
other education fields, divergent behavior may be 
more pronounced because their interests differ 
from the interests of the managers from the field of 
economics. For example, achieving a better hospital 
image can be more important than achieving effi-
ciency and maximizing the owner's profit, which is a 
classic example of influence of the agent theory, as 
by doing so, one potentially decreases the value for 
the owner. The conclusion is that the qualifications 
of the directors cannot be the reason for the pos-
sible differences in the performance of the private 
and public institutions and the related differences 
considering impact of the agent theory in the insti-
tutions themselves.7
2.3.2. Analysis of the selected private health 
institutions operations 
After examining the professional qualifications, 
research focuses on business operations analysis 
based on the largest private polyclinics. Given the 
market mechanisms affecting these institutions, but 
also the increasing role of private health care insti-
tutions due to the independence of Croatia, their 
establishment on the market could be expected. 
Source: authors’ research based on data collected from official websites of private institutions and publicly available 
information.
Figure 3 Examination of professional qualification of directors in Croatian private health institutions
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This assumption will be examined on the example 
of the three largest private polyclinics in Croatia. 
Data is based on the financial statements of the in-
stitutions that are provided by the Financial Agency. 
Business operations data is presented in Table 5.
Data show that all polyclinics achieved a certain 
growth over the observed period. According to the 
business results, it can be concluded that they are 
successful in their performance. But if one looks 
more closely at the financial statements, one can 
notice that certain clinics have business problems. 
So, according to reports received by the Financial 
Agency, Polyclinic Medikol and Polyclinic Sunce, in 
the period before 2015, had some difficulties in 
business operations because they reported large 
losses from the previous period, and recorded a 
large reduction in the category of capital and re-
serves in the balance sheet. This category is neg-
ative in the case of the Polyclinic Sunce. It is obvi-
ous that certain turnaround in the performance of 
these two polyclinics has occurred since they are 
now succeeding in achieving a positive business 
result. The Polyclinic Svjetlost has the most stable 
business performance as it manages from year-to-
year to increase its profit and does not convey the 
losses from the previous period. According to this 
data, there is a problem with management in pri-
vate part of the health care system, which is further 
emphasized because it occurs in the two largest 
polyclinics in Croatia. Figure 4 shows the average 
structure of business expenditure of three polyclin-
ics and special hospitals for comparison with public 
hospitals.
The structure of expenditures of the aforemen-
tioned private polyclinics differs from the structure 
of public hospitals that is shown in the earlier part 
of the paper. A different approach to cost manage-
ment can be noticed. First of all, a delegation of 
work that is more efficient in private health care 
institutions. As a result, the costs for employees oc-
cupy a much smaller share in the overall cost struc-
ture. It is clear that some other items also have an 
impact on the fact that the costs for employees are 
higher in public institutions and it is more difficult 
to plan them. However, the difference in costs struc-
ture is quite large and the question arises whether 
they can be connected with the principal-agent re-
lation. It is difficult to prove it with certainty, but it 
can be assumed that there is a certain impact due 
to the emergence of multiple principals, but also 
the absence of market mechanisms, which is why 
it is difficult to motivate agents to act in the right 
direction for the institution itself.
2.4. Overview of business performance on the 
example of health care institutions from the 
private and public part of health care system
The previous analysis referred to the observation 
Source: authors’ calculation based on data from institutions financial statements provided by the Financial Agency.
Figure 4 Average structure of business costs of Polyclinic Medikol, Polyclinic Sunce and Special Hospital Svjetlost for 2016
Category Medikol Sunce Svjetlost2015 2016 2015 2016 2015 2016
Total revenue 85.821.765 107.816.914 74.764.709 78.620.495 39.194.623 45.377.641
Total 
expenditure 85.736.250 102.713.086 73.983.750 71.673.774 35.793.062 39.551.477
Profit/loss 85.515 5.103.828 780.959 6.946.721 2.713.372 4.641.608
EBIT 4.567.759 6.109.755 1.978.415 8.053.375 3.266.456 5.342.164
Source: Financial reports of selected polyclinics provided by Financial Agency.
Table 5 Result of business operations of selected private polyclinics for 2015 and 2016, HRK
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of certain trends in the private and public part of 
the health care system on the example of sever-
al selected institutions. This section will make a 
comparison of business performance between two 
institutions, one in the private and the other in pub-
lic ownership. Within this, it will be attempted to 
identify whether the influence of agent theory ex-
ists. Selected institutions are specialized in provid-
ing specific services in a specific area of medicine 
for easier comparison. From the private part of the 
system, business performance of Specijalna bolnica 
za oftamologiju Svjetlost (University Eye Hospital 
Svjetlost) will be analyzed, and from the public part 
Specijalna bolnica za ortopediju Biograd na Moru 
(Special hospital for orthopedics Biograd na Moru).
2.4.1. Analysis of business performance on the 
example of the Specijalna bolnica za ortopediju 
Biograd na moru
Specijalna bolnica za ortopediju Biograd na Moru 
operates within the public sector and belongs to 
public health institutions. Specifically, it is owned 
and controlled by the Zadar County. Details of its 
business performance are taken from the official 
website of the specialist hospital. It operates within 
hospital activities and specializes in providing ser-
vices related to orthopedic problems of patients. 
At the very beginning of the analysis, data on total 
revenue and expenditure are shown in Table 6.
In both observed years, the hospital generated a 
revenue shortage, although it was smaller in the 
second observed year. Deficit reduction is mainly 
caused by the revenue growth of institution which 
mostly refers to payments from the state budget 
because the hospital is a budget user. A discourag-
ing fact is that expenditure grew compared to the 
previous year. In order to evaluate the work of man-
agement, it is necessary to analyze more closely the 
structure of operating expenses. In an earlier anal-
ysis on the example of public health institutions, 
most of the expenditures were related to expen-
diture for employees and material expenditure, so 
such a structure is expected here too.
According to expectations, 99.85% of total 
expenditures are related to expenditures for 
employees and material expenditure. It can be 
assumed that most of these expenditures are rel-
atively difficult to avoid due to the specific nature 
of public health institutions. But a certain part of 
these expenditures is potentially manageable. The 
question is what is the role of management, con-
sidering cost management quality? The assumption 
is that at least one member of the management 
structure must have been an expert in that area. 
Ideally, the top manager should understand the im-
portance of comprehensive cost management, but 
also have some knowledge in that area. If this is not 
the case, there is a danger of impact of the agent 
theory, but also the stewardship theory at that in-
stitution. Looking from the aspect of agent theory, 
it can be concluded that management did not meet 
the minimum requirements of the local community 
(principals) related to achieving a positive business 
result. The question is how much this affects the as-
Category 2015 2016
1. Total revenue 38.458.803 41.237.581
2. Total expenditure 44.624.811 45.119.887
3. Surplus/deficit (1.-2.) - 6.166.008 - 3.882.306
Source: Specijalna bolnica za ortopediju Biograd na Moru (2017).
Table 6 Total business revenue and expenditure of Specijalna bolnica za ortopediju Biograd na Moru, HRK
Source: Specijalna bolnica za ortopediju Biograd na Moru (2017).
Figure 5 Structure of operating expenditure of the Specijalna bolnica za ortopediju Biograd na moru for 2016
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sumptions of agent theory and stewardship theory? 
If the influence of agent theory exists, it is assumed 
there is an unwanted action of agents in the form 
of meeting their own discretionary goals. From an 
economic point of view, the primary objective of 
health care institutions should be to achieve as 
efficient business with the minimum requirement 
of covering the expenditures. This is because such 
business operation is in the interest, in this case, of 
a local community that is the founder and owner 
of the institution. If the agents fail to realize this, 
it is possible that some other interests exist con-
cerning the direction in which they operate and 
which diverges from the interest of the principal. 
It is also possible that their limited rationality, i.e. 
insufficient knowledge of laws of economics, af-
fects the fulfillment of the principal objectives. The 
influence of stewardship theory to some extent al-
ways exists in business entities due to the limited 
cognitive ability of agents. Since the director of the 
hospital is educated in the field of economics, it 
cannot be assumed that the dominance of steward-
ship theory exists that would otherwise explain the 
negative performance of the institution by the fact 
that there is no specific knowledge in the field of 
management. The reasons for inefficient business 
performance need to be sought in the sphere of 
agent influence. Specifically, it is possible that this 
influence further emphasizes the emergence of a 
larger number of stakeholder groups in the role of 
principal, and this is the characteristic of the public 
sector. Thus, an agent in the business entity will not 
follow the interests of one stakeholder group but 
will seek a compromise to satisfy more than one 
party. This affects the possibility of designing an 
efficient incentive system in such companies, which 
will motivate agents to maximize their behavior. A 
factor that further complicates the motivation of 
agents is the absence of market mechanisms. Table 
7 presents certain financial ratios of the hospital.
Based on these indicators, it is possible to evalu-
ate the efficiency of management in institutions 
where the primary goal is not gaining profits or 
maximizing the value for the owner. It should be 
emphasized that the value of all indicators in 2016 
has improved compared to the previous year. The 
main reason for this is an increase in the total rev-
enue of the institution. One of the key indicators of 
management efficiency is the revenue/expenditure 
ratio of regular operations because it shows success 
of operations in an area of business that pertains to 
the purpose of the existence of a business entity. It 
is obvious that the value of this indicator in both 
years is more favorable than the revenue/expendi-
ture ratio of the overall business. However, its value 
is unsatisfactory because it should be greater, or at 
least equal to 1. According to the above indicators, 
it can be concluded that management is not suc-
cessful in meeting the principal's goal, because the 
revenue/expenditure ratio is less than 1, which af-
fects the negative profitability of assets and equity 
and that there are certain problems related to cost 
management.
2.4.2. Analysis of business performance on the 
example of Specijalna bolnica za oftamologiju 
Svjetlost
Before presenting the research findings, it is neces-
sary to explain why this hospital was selected for 
the analysis. The main reason is the possibility of 
comparison with the Specijalna bolnica za ortope-
diju Biograd na Moru from the public part of the 
health care system. The two are comparable pri-
marily because they specialize in a particular area 
of medicine, and the additional reason is that they 
achieve similar levels of income and expenditure. 
The special hospital operates in the private part of 
the health care system and provides services that 
Financial ratios 2015 2016
Total assets turnover ratio 0.2978 0.3274
Revenue/expenditure ratio of overall 
operations 0.8618 0.9140
Revenue/expenditure ratio of regular 
operations 0.9126 0.9659
Profitability of assets - 4.78% - 3.07%
Profitability of equity - 5.24% -3.44%
Source: Specijalna bolnica za ortopediju Biograd na Moru (2017).
Table 7 Certain financial ratios of Specijalna bolnica za ortopediju Biograd na Moru for 2015 and 2016 
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are related to the ophthalmological problems of 
the patients. It is a small business. In this business 
entity there was no separation of ownership from 
the management since the owner is also the direc-
tor, but the financial part of the business is conduct-
ed by an expert in the field of economics (Specijal-
na bolnica za oftamologiju Svjetlost, 2017). This can 
be important information when making final con-
clusions. Total revenue and expenditure and level 
of earnings in 2015 and 2016 are already shown in 
Table 5 so the analysis in this part will focus on the 
structure of operating expenditure. The structure is 
displayed in Figure 6.
When compared to the Specijalna bolnica Biograd na 
Moru, it can be noticed that the structure of expen-
ditures of two institutions is significantly different. In 
the case of the hospital Svjetlost, there is a domi-
nation of material costs, while in hospital Biograd 
na Moru the costs for employees are dominant. This 
points to a significantly different way of manage-
ment methods between these two institutions, es-
pecially when considering that they have a similar 
level of income and operating expenditure. The av-
erage cost per employee at the hospital Svjetlost is 
around 14 431 kuna per month. Because hospital is 
successful in gaining profits, it can be concluded that 
management is successful considering work delega-
tion and that such average salary is justified. In Table 
8 financial ratios of the Specijalna bolnica Svjetlost 
can be seen.
The hospital achieves remarkable results for all indi-
cators. It can be said that management is successful 
in managing business operations because the com-
pany stays steadily at high profit levels. If a compar-
ison is made with the Specijalna bolnica Biograd na 
Moru, there are significant differences in the success 
of the business operations in favor of the Specijalna 
bolnica Svjetlost. Although the hospital director is 
a medical specialist (also owner), hospital business 
operations are financially stable with great prospects 
for further development. It seems that the director 
has consciously handed this segment of business to 
experts in the field, which can be considered a good 
business decision. When considering the success of 
the business operations, it is concluded that there 
are no significant conflicts between principals and 
agents in this particular institution. It differs from 
the public health care system, where based on the 
success of the business operations, it can be assumed 
that there is a certain influence of the agent theory 
(primarily because of problems with the motivation 
of agents in public hospitals).
2.5. Final findings about impact of the agent 
theory in the Croatian health care system
This subchapter concludes the research of impact 
of the agent theory on the example of the Croatian 
Source: Specijalna bolnica za oftamologiju Svjetlost (2017). 
Figure 6 Structure of operating expenditure of Specijalna bolnica Svjetlost 2016
Financial ratio 2015 2016
Total assets turnover ratio 4.92 5.44
Revenue/expenditure ratio of overall 
operations 1.095 1.15
Revenue/expenditure ratio of regular 
operations 1.092 1.14
Profitability of assets 41.01% 64.09%
Profitability of equity 67.10% 81.86%
Source: Specijalna bolnica za oftamologiju Svjetlost (2017). 
Table 8 Financial ratios of Specijalna bolnica Svjetlost in 2015 and 2016 
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health care system. Here, all the findings that arise 
from the concrete research will be summarized. 
The first part of the study referred to the strategic 
analysis of the Croatian health care system and the 
analysis of impact of the agent theory was not con-
ducted within it. The finding that was to a certain 
extent essential for the continuation of the work 
was related to the lack of information concerning 
the number of business entities from the private 
part of the health care system, that is, it was almost 
impossible to determine the specific number of 
health institutions operating within it.
The second part referred to the examination of pro-
fessional qualifications of senior managers in pri-
vate and public health institutions. The aim was to 
confirm or deny the assumption that there is a larg-
er share of experts in the field of economics that 
led the institutions from the private part of the sys-
tem. The research has shown that there are no dif-
ferences in the qualifications of managers between 
public and private institutions. In the overall share 
of both systems, managers who are not experts in 
the field of economics are dominant. The conclusion 
is that the qualifications of top managers cannot be 
the reason for the different impact of the agent the-
ory in private and public health institutions. It was 
further concluded that due to the lack of experts 
from the field of economics in the position of a di-
rector, there is a significant impact of the steward-
ship theory (limited cognitive ability). The analysis 
of revenue and expenditure of selected public 
and private institutions has highlighted problems 
regarding covering expenditure with which public 
institutions are faced. The potential source of this 
problem was found in the analysis of the structure 
of expenditures. Based on the average structure of 
expenditures of selected private and public institu-
tions it was found that their structures differ. The 
average cost of employees had a larger share in the 
structure of total operating expenditure in the case 
of three public institutions, while in the case of pri-
vate larger share had material costs. Such a differ-
ent structure indicates the possibility of existence 
of agent theory influence in public institutions due 
to the lack of market mechanisms that would force 
them to minimize costs. It has been noted that there 
are also problems with the management of private 
health care institutions regarding the high losses 
that two of the three observed institutions have 
achieved in the periods before 2015. This indicates 
that there exists a certain influence of the agent 
theory, but also the stewardship theory (the ques-
tion of professional qualification of the director).
In the last part of the research the analysis was 
based on the examination of business performance 
of individual institutions from the private and pub-
lic part of the health care system. In this part, there 
was a final confirmation of the different impact of 
the agent theory in private and public institutions. 
Although in the analyzed public health institution 
the director was educated in the field of economics, 
he failed to meet the minimum requirement of the 
principal in terms of achieving positive business 
operations. In the private institution that has been 
analyzed, the director is not educated in the field of 
economics, but the business performance from the 
economic aspect is satisfactory. The final conclu-
sion is that the impact of the agent theory is more 
pronounced in public health institutions due to the 
lack of market mechanisms that would encourage 
agents to behave in a maximizing way, but also the 
ambiguity of the business goal, which partly stems 
from the existence of a larger number of principals 
with significant impact on them.
3. Conclusion
The primary objective of this paper was to examine 
differences considering impact of the agent theory 
in private and public companies on the example of 
Croatian health care system. The first part of the 
paper referred to the theoretical description of the 
problem that relates to agent theory. Within this, 
the reasons for conflicts between principals and 
agents and ways of solving them are analyzed. Also, 
there are some basic differences between business 
entities in public and private ownership, as well as, 
the specificities of the influence of agent theory in 
public business entities. The key differences relate 
to the ability to motivate agents in public compa-
nies and institutions. The main reasons relate to 
the existence of a larger number of principals, the 
absence of market mechanisms and the greater 
number of tasks that agents have to fulfill. These 
reasons influence the fact that it is more difficult to 
create an effective incentive system in public busi-
ness entities that will motivate agents to behave 
according to objectives of principals. In the second 
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part of the paper, related to the specific research, 
there were some findings that could lead to an-
swers to the previously asked questions. The main 
problem with the research was the lack of publicly 
available data on the activities of public and private 
institutions. This is because they are not required to 
publish their financial statements publicly, so the 
reports are collected directly from the Financial 
Agency. Due to data discrepancy, it is difficult to 
precisely quantify the number of companies oper-
ating in the private health care sector. The analysis 
pointed to the specifics of the private and public 
part of the health care system that arise from its 
own structure. Such a structure, to a certain extent, 
limits the efficiency of public institutions because 
they cannot directly charge the service from the 
user. By analyzing "Porter's five forces", the finding 
was that there is a large rivalry among the mar-
ket participants in the private health care system 
because the market is relatively fragmented. Also, 
private consumption of health care in Croatia is still 
at a relatively low level, limiting the development 
of the private health sector. The research on the ex-
ample of the concrete institutions gave answers to 
the most important issues in the paper and its goal 
was fulfilled within it. Response to the question of 
the professional qualification of the director was 
provided, i.e. the premise that the private sector 
has a higher share of the economics managers was 
not proven. A financial analysis based on a number 
of institutions has shown that private health care 
institutions are more efficient in terms of gaining 
profits. However, two out of the three analyzed 
privately-owned companies have had major busi-
ness problems and have generated great losses 
that continue to burden their business. The big-
gest differences in efficiency were observed in the 
structure of operating expenditures. The conclusion 
is that the structure of private-sector business ex-
penditures is more favorable as costs of employees 
occupy a smaller share in the overall structure of 
expenditures, while in public institutions they rep-
resent most of the total expenditure. This finding 
has indicated the possibility of a greater impact of 
the agent theory in public institutions than in the 
private ones. Following analysis of concrete institu-
tions has confirmed this. The final conclusion con-
sidering impact of the agent theory in private and 
public health institutions needs to be displayed in 
a way that takes into account all the above-men-
tioned findings. First and foremost, it is necessary 
to emphasize the particularity of the public health 
care system, which makes management of people 
more difficult. All problems that further emphasize 
the impact of the agent theory should be added 
to the above-mentioned particularity. The analysis 
made it clear that public institutions have problems 
with efficiency. The main reason for this is the spe-
cific nature of the public sector due to the absence 
of market mechanisms, but also the emergence of 
multiple principals to which the agents answer and 
the multiple tasks they have to fulfill. Because there 
is no major difference in the professional qualifica-
tions of directors in private and public institutions, 
it is assumed that the impact of the agent theory is 
more pronounced in public institutions.
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